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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Keio Ronon Smoke appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on his 
guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine. On appeal, Smoke challenges the denial 
of his motion to suppress and argues that his sentence is excessive. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the late evening hours of December 1, 2010, Officer Schiffler enforced a traffic 
stop on a pickup truck with canceled registration and fictitious license plates. 
(5/13/2011 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.5.) The driver of the vehicle, Smoke, immediately 
exited the pickup and, ignoring Officer Schiffler's lawful commands to stop, took flight on 
foot. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-11; p.14, Ls.2-4.) Additional officers were called to assist 
and eventually succeeded in apprehending Smoke. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.14, L.5 - p.15, 
L.1.) 
Returning to Smoke's vehicle, officers deployed a certified drug-detection dog on 
the outside of the pickup truck. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.12; p.28, Ls.5-21.) 
The dog alerted to the presence of narcotics near the passenger side door. (5/13/2011 
Tr., p.28, L.22 - p.29, L.9; p.36, Ls.7-15.) Opening the truck's door, officers found in 
plain view on the passenger seat a black bag which contained 54 grams of 
methamphetamine and other instruments associated with the drug trade. (5/13/2011 
Tr., p.29, Ls.10-13; p.31, L.13-p.32, L.3; R., p.69.) 
The state charged Smoke with trafficking in methamphetamine and possession 
of methamphetmaine. (R., pp.24-25.) Smoke moved to suppress the evidence found 
by police, arguing that the search of his vehicle subsequent to his arrest was 
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unconstitutional. (R., pp.48-56.) After a hearing on the motion (see 5/13/2011 Tr., pp.5-
47), the district court denied Smoke's suppression motion, finding that officers had 
independent probable cause that drugs were in the vehicle, which created an exception 
to the warrant requirement (5/13/2011 Tr., p.46, L.9 - p.47, L.5; R., pp.89-90). 
Smoke entered into a conditional plea agreement with prosecutors, preserving 
his right to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion, and pursuant to which he 
pied guilty to the trafficking charge and the state dismissed the possession charge. 
(6/1/2011 Tr., p.52, Ls.11-24; p.58, Ls.9-15; R., pp.82-88.) The district court entered a 
judgment of conviction and imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed 
for trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.93-95.) Smoke filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.100-02.) 
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ISSUES 
Smoke states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Smoke's motion to 
suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Smoke, following 
his plea of guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Smoke failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his suppression 
motion? 
2. Has Smoke failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion in imposing a sentence of 15 years with four years fixed on Smoke's 




Smoke Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To 
Suppress 
A. Introduction 
"[MJindful of the fact that a reliable drug dog's alert can provide probable cause 
for the search of a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," 
Smoke still argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Smoke has failed to show either clear error in the district 
court's factual findings, or error in its application of law to those findings. The district 
court's denial of his suppression motion should therefore be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 
P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. 
App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State 
v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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C. The District Court Properly Denied Smoke's Suppression Motion 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
Routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). 
"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
One such exception to the warrant requirement is the "automobile exception," 
which allows warrantless searches of vehicles when there is probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. See California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991 ); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982); 
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999). "Probable cause is 
established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a 
person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched 
contained contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 
172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 823). 
A drug-detection dog's sniff of the outside of an automobile need not be justified 
by suspicion of drug activity because it is not a "search" that implicates a privacy 
interest. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 
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436, 442, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Ct. App. 2001 ). However, "[w]hen a reliable drug-
detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of 
controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in 
the automobile and may search it without a warrant." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 
P.3d at 1148 (quoting State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 
2005)). 
Smoke conceded below that Officer Schiffler had probable cause to pull him over 
due to his cancelled registration and fictitious plates, and that he unlawfully exited the 
vehicle and fled the scene. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.11.) Smoke's flight 
provided officers with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, allowing them to 
investigate. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000). In that investigation, a 
drug-detection dog was deployed around the outside of Smoke's vehicle. (5/13/2011 
Tr., p.28, Ls.5-21.) The drug-detection dog was state certified and reliable. (5/13/2011 
Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.12.) Performing an open-air sniff, the dog indicated that 
narcotics were present near the passenger door. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.28, L.22 - p.29, L.9; 
Tr., p.36, Ls.7-15.) Upon opening the door, police found resting in plain view on the 
car's front seat a bag containing 54 grams of methamphetamine and other instruments 
associated with drug trafficking. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.29, Ls.10-13; p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.3; 
R., p.69.) 
Smoke asserts on appeal that, because he had been apprehended, officers 
needed to secure his vehicle and get a warrant before they could search it. (Appellant's 
brief, p.7.) Smoke's argument is unsupported by relevant legal standards. As noted 
above, "[w]hen a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped 
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automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to 
believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant." 
Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (quoting Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 
P.3d at 428). Because Smoke's vehicle was lawfully stopped, and a reliable drug-
detection dog alerted officers that his car contained drugs, officers had independent 
probable cause to search the vehicle and did not need a warrant. 
Smoke has failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. The district court properly applied the relevant legal standards to the facts 
which were presented before it when it denied the suppression motion. The district 
court's order denying the motion should be affirmed. 
11. 
Smoke Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing Discretion 
Smoke asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and 
executed a unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed following his conviction for 
trafficking in methamphetamine, in light of his professed desires for substance abuse 
treatment and acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Smoke has 
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To 
carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of 
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is 
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necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Though courts review the whole sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed 
portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. 
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, 
the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. 
Both the nature of Smoke's crimes and his criminal character support the district 
court's sentence. While sentencing Smoke, the district court acknowledged that Smoke 
was an alcoholic, but also recognized that Smoke was found trafficking in "a significant 
amount of methamphetamine," which "is a very, very dangerous drug" and "[v]ery 
detrimental to our community." (7/20/2011 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.6.) In the present 
offense, Smoke was trafficking in 54 grams of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.2.) When 
pulled-over by police for his cancelled registration and fictitious plates, he tried to flee 
from officers. (5/13/2011 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.11.) And Smoke had apparently been 
operating his vehicle while under the influence. (PSI, p.2.) 
Smoke's lengthy criminal history displays a blatant disregard for the law. That 
history includes theft and other property crimes, substance abuse and possession 
crimes, violent crimes, and now drug trafficking. (See PSI, pp.3-4; 2005 PSI, pp.3-8 
(appended to PSI).) Relevant to his current offenses, Smoke has 19 charges for failing 
to purchase proper licenses or insurance, or otherwise driving without privileges. (Id.) 
He has been charged with resisting arrest at least eight times. (Id.) And Smoke is a 
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danger to the community, having been charged with driving under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol at least 10 times, including two aggravated DU ls and a DUI with a failure to 
stop at the scene of an accident. (Id.) 
Smoke falsified significant portions of his PSI interview. (PSI, p.11.) He claimed 
that he only drank a couple of times while on parole (PSI, p.9); in fact he abused 
substances extensively (7/20/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25; PSI, p.11). He claimed that he 
voluntarily moved out of his girlfriend's house when their relationship ended in 
September 2010 (PSI, p.6); in fact his girlfriend kicked him out of the house in May due 
to his alcohol abuse (PSI, pp.9, 11 ). He claimed that he was laid-off in September from 
his construction job due to a lack of work (PSI, p.8); in fact Smoke was fired in July 
(PSI, pp.8, 11 ). Smoke never accounted for where he lived from May through 
September, nor for how he financially supported himself leading up to his crimes. (PSI, 
p.11.) Smoke's falsifying and withholding such information supports the presentence 
investigator's recommendation that he was not a candidate for treatment within the 
community, and supports the sentence of confinement imposed by the district court. 
On appeal, Smoke argues that "not only does [he] understand his addictions, but 
he has the desire to become drug and alcohol free." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Of course, 
Smoke expressed that same understanding and desire pending sentencing for his last 
felony conviction in 2005. (See 2005 PSI, p.14.) Smoke's desire to become drug and 
alcohol free has not caused a reduction in his criminal behavior. Smoke also asserts 
that he "accepts full responsibility and exhibits sincere remorse for his actions." 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) Smoke's sincerity, however, is called into question by his 
statement that "[he] fully accept[ed] the responsibility of putting himself in a ridiculous 
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situation" (7/20/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23 (emphasis added)), and his assertions that 
while he knew he was transporting an illegal substance he did not know to what extent 
(PSI, p.3). It does not appear that Smoke has ever acknowledged any responsibility for 
his actual crime: trafficking in 54 grams of methamphetamine. 
Smoke has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
Smoke's suppression motion and affirm Smoke's conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 2012. 
c~ R=iTJ. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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